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Abstract 
Problem statement: Two experiments were conducted to test the hypothesis that the loss-sensitivity principle extends to 
integration of the outcomes of two concurrent risky decisions. Purpose of Study: According to this principle, only expected loss 
outcomes of concurrent decisions would be integrated. Method: A total of 96 undergraduates participated in two experiments. 
Findings and Results: The results of Experiment 1 showed consistent with the loss sensitivity principle that a prior outcome was 
integrated with the expected loss outcome of a current decision. However, there was no evidence for integration of the expected 
loss outcomes of two concurrent decisions. A possible explanation implying that outcomes are ignored if they have not yet 
occurred was followed up in Experiment 2 where participants were offered bonuses to increase their sensitivity either to gains or 
losses. An effect of bonus was observed but again there was no evidence for integration of the outcomes of concurrent decisions. 
Conclusion: Although confirmed in several previous experiments when choices were made between mixed bets with both gain 
and loss outcomes, whether the loss-sensitivity principle extends to integration of prior outcomes when choices are made 
between losses or between gains was also questioned by the results. 
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
Peer-review under responsibility of Academic World Research and Education Center. 
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1. Introduction 
People find it in general difficult to make decisions, that is, to select one of several possible future courses of 
action. One difficulty is to assess uncertainties, another one to resolve value conflicts. A less often noted additional 
difficulty is to make sequential decisions whose outcomes are dependent on each other (Brehmer, 1992; Huber, 
                                                          
* Ole Boe. Tel.: +47-23099448. 
E-mail address: olboe@mil.no. 
 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://creativecommons. rg/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Peer-review under responsibility of Academic World Research and Education Center.
551 Ole Boe and Tommy Garling /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  190 ( 2015 )  550 – 558 
1990). This difficulty is exemplified by the sunk cost effect, that is, the irrational effect of a previous loss on 
evaluations of the outcomes of a current decision (Arkes & Blumer, 1985; Brockner, 1992). A decision maker may 
also encounter a related difficulty when facing several decisions at the same time. 
     When two or more decisions are faced concurrently, these decisions may be dependent or independent. Two 
decisions are dependent if the utility or value of the outcomes of one decision affects the evaluation of the utility or 
value of the outcomes of the other decision. If this is not the case, the two decisions are independent. However, even 
though decisions are dependent, they may be made independently. Consider the following example taken from 
Tversky and Kahneman (1981, p. 454): 
 
     Imagine that you face the following pair of concurrent decisions. First examine both decisions, then indicate the 
options you prefer. 
 
Decision (i). Choose between: 
A. a sure gain of $240 
B. 25% chance to gain $1000, and 75% chance to gain nothing 
Decision (ii). Choose between: 
C. a sure loss of $750 
D. 75% chance to lose $1000, and 25% chance to lose nothing 
 
     A majority of participants chose A and D. However, in choosing between the following two alternatives they 
chose B´ which maximizes expected utility: 
 
A´. 25% chance to gain $240, and 75% chance to lose $760 
B´. 25% chance to gain $240, and 75% chance to lose $750 
 
     As realized, alternative B´ is B and C combined whereas A´ is A and D combined. Thus, participants did not 
make the two decisions which overall maximized expected value. The questions this raises are: When and how are 
outcomes of several decisions integrated? Integration refers to adding values or utilities of the expected outcomes. In 
prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky 1979; Tversky & Fox, 1995; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) it is assumed that 
a decision maker edits options prior to assigning values to outcomes. Editing operations include framing of 
outcomes as gains or losses relative to a reference point. Framing also entails segregating or integrating outcomes. 
Tversky and Kahneman (1981) believed that outcomes are frequently segregated because this "(i) simplifies 
evaluations and reduces cognitive strain, (ii) reflects the intuition that consequences should be causally linked to 
acts, and (iii) matches the properties of hedonic experience which is more sensitive to desirable and undesirable 
changes than to steady states" (p. 457). 
     Other research (Arkes & Blumer, 1985; Garling & Romanus, 1997; Garling, Romanus, & Selart, 1994; 
Laughhunn & Payne, 1984; Thaler & Johnson, 1990; see Garling et al., 1997b, for review) has demonstrated 
influences of prior outcomes on subsequent choices. Such integration of prior outcomes sometimes occurs despite 
the fact that it requires cognitive effort (Romanus, Hassing, & Garling, 1996; Romanus, Karlsson, & Garling, 1997). 
Several motivational explanations have therefore been proposed. In this vein, Thaler and Johnson (1990) and Thaler 
(1980, 1985) suggested that prospect theory needs to incorporate a hedonic editing rule. Whereas other editing rules 
are employed for the sake of cognitive simplification, the goal of the hedonic editing rule (i.e., 
integrating/segregating a prior outcome) is to maximize value. An alternative account is labeled the renewable 
resources model (Linville & Fischer, 1991). The point of departure is still that a decision maker maximizes value. 
Since a gain is believed to buffer a loss, outcomes entailing gains and losses are integrated. However, being aware of 
his or her limited but renewable resources to cope with large losses, multiple losses are aversive to the decision 
maker who will therefore segregate them. Gain-savoring resources are also perceived to be limited but renewable. 
Therefore, multiple gains are segregated. As noted by Larrick (1993), in risky choices, people are often more 
concerned with avoiding negative outcomes than attaining positive ones. This may reflect that anticipated negative 
events are more salient (Taylor, 1991; Weber, 1994).  
     A compatible editing rule of integration/segregation proposed by Garling and Romanus (1997) as the loss-
sensitivity principle is to only add the prior outcome to the expected loss of the current choice. Since a prior loss is 
integrated with an expected loss, the dissatisfaction with the expected loss will increase after a loss. Conversely, 
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since a prior gain is integrated with an expected loss, the dissatisfaction will decrease after a gain. Satisfaction with 
an expected gain is, however, not affected by a prior outcome. 
     In the present study we investigate whether the loss-sensitivity principle extends to integration of the outcomes of 
concurrent decisions. In two experiments we directly compare decisions made by groups of participants who are 
asked to make two concurrent decisions to decisions made by other groups of participants who are told that they 
have experienced a prior outcome. In the former groups the options for one of the decisions are such that we expect 
participants to make the choice which with a specified probability would lead to the same outcome as participants in 
the latter groups are told that they have experienced. 
2. Experiment 1 
     In Experiment 1 we attempt to replicate the results of previous experiments (Garling & Romanus, 1997; Garling 
et al., 1994; Romanus et al., 1996, 1997) in that participants in one of two groups are asked to choose between 
gambling and not gambling after no prior outcome, after a prior loss, or after a prior gain. The loss-sensitivity 
principle predicts that gambling will be chosen after a prior gain but not after a prior loss since the prior outcome is 
added to the expected loss. To show this, assume first that the choice of gambling is an increasing function of the 
difference between the value of gambling and the value of not gambling. According to prospect theory (Kahneman 
& Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Fox, 1995; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992), the value of gambling (V) may in turn be 
related to the sum of the value or satisfaction (v) with winning and the dissatisfaction with losing, multiplied by 
decision weights π(p) which are related to the probability (p) of each of the outcomes. Thus, V(gambling) = 
π(p)[v(winning)] - π(1-p)[v(losing)] (1). It is readily seen that if in accordance with the loss-sensitivity principle the 
prior outcome is only added to the loss in Equation (1), a prior gain would lead to more and a prior loss to fewer 
choices of gambling.  
     In applying the loss-sensitivity principle to concurrent decisions, we make the assumption that the effect of a 
future outcome of a prior decision is the same as of a prior outcome. However, since concurrent decisions are 
assumed to be made at the same time, it is not in general specified which outcomes should be considered to precede 
other outcomes. A possibility consistent with the loss-sensitivity principle (Garling et al., 1997a) is that only loss 
outcomes are integrated. If this is the case, the results for concurrent decisions would only be identical to the results 
for prior losses. In Experiment 1 one group of participants was informed about prior outcomes whereas another 
group of participants made concurrent decisions. In one of the decisions which the latter group made, with the 
probability of .50 the dominant options led to the same outcomes (losses or gains) as participants in the other group 
were told that they had experienced. Identical integration was expected in these groups when in the prior-outcome 
group the prior outcome led to a loss. 
3. Method 
3.1. Participants 
     Thirty-two undergraduates at Göteborg University participated in return for the equivalent of approximately USD 
7.00. They were recruited from a pool of undergraduates who at the beginning of the semester volunteered to 
participate in experiments. An equal number of men and women were randomly assigned to two groups which each 
consisted of 16 participants.     
3.2. Design     
     The design was mixed factorial with one between-subjects and one within-subject factor. Whether participants 
were informed about a prior outcome or asked to make two concurrent decisions was varied as the between-subjects 
factor. The prior outcome/future outcome of the concurrent decisions was varied as the within-subject factor (no 
prior outcome/decision, a prior gain, or a prior loss). 
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3.3. Materials and procedure 
    Participants served individually or in groups of at most four at the same time. They were seated in private booths 
facing a computer. On the computer screen general instructions were first presented and read by the participants. An 
experimenter was present to answer questions. A sequence of fictitious non-contextual bets was then presented. 
Participants encountered two blocks of bets. In one of the blocks, the same sequences of single bets were presented 
in both groups. All bets consisted of choices between an even chance of winning a certain amount or losing half that 
amount and choosing not to gamble. The different bets were winning SEK 4,000 or losing SEK 2,000 (the 
equivalent of approximately USD 500.00 or USD 250.00), winning SEK 5,000 or losing SEK 2,500, winning SEK 
6,000 or losing SEK 3,000, and winning SEK 7,000 or losing SEK 3,500, respectively. 
     The other block differed in the two groups. In the concurrent-decisions group participants were in this block 
presented with two bets at the same time. In the first bets which on the computer screen appeared above the second, 
in half the trials participants chose between an even chance of winning a large amount (SEK 1200, SEK 1500, SEK 
1800, or SEK 2100) or nothing and an even chance of winning a small amount (SEK 1000, SEK 1300, SEK 1600, 
or SEK 1900) or nothing. In the other half of the trials participants chose between an even chance of losing a large 
amount (SEK 1400, SEK 1700, SEK 2000, or SEK 2300) or nothing and an even chance of losing a small amount 
(SEK 1200, SEK 1500, SEK 1800, or SEK 2100) or nothing. Participants were expected to choose winning a large 
and losing a small amount since these options was dominant, thus their choices should result in an even chance of 
winning or losing the indicated amounts. The second decisions consisted of the same bets as in the block of single 
bets. Each one was once combined with a choice between gains, once with a choice between losses. 
     In the prior-outcome group participants were told each time that they had lost or won a certain amount and that 
they now had a choice between an even chance of winning a certain amount or losing half that amount. The prior 
losses and gains were exactly the same as participants in the concurrent-decisions group would win or lose with the 
probability of .50 if they chose the dominant option. In other respects the procedure was the same.  
     In both groups participants were in each trial asked to ponder all information presented on the computer screen at 
the same time as they made their decisions. In the concurrent-decisions group they were then asked to first type a 
number (1 or 2) corresponding to their choice in the first bet followed by a rating on a scale from 1 to 100 of how 
much they preferred the chosen option. When they had done that, they were asked to type a number (3 or 4) 
corresponding to their choice in the second bet followed by a rating on a scale from 1 to 100 of how much they 
preferred the chosen option. In the prior-outcome group participants only performed the second choices and ratings. 
A session lasted for approximately 30 minutes after which participants were debriefed and paid. 
4. Results and Findings      
    The dominant options were as expected more frequently chosen, somewhat more frequently for gains (98.4%) 
than for losses (93.4%). A t-test did, however, not show that this difference was significant. The mean gambling 
choices are given in Table 1. The ratings are not reported since they yielded closely similar results. As may be seen, 
there is an effect of prior outcome such that the choices of gambling decrease after a loss and increase after a gain. 
However, no such effect is present in the concurrent-decisions group. A 2 (concurrent decisions vs. decisions with 
prior outcome) by 3 (no prior outcome/decision vs. prior loss vs. prior gain) mixed ANOVA with repeated measures 
on the last factor yielded a significant main effect of prior outcome, F(1.81, 54.36)= 3.57, p<.05, MSe=.24, after 
Geisser-Greenhouse correction of the dfs. This effect was almost reliably modified by group, F(1.81, 54.36)= 3.08, 
p=.09, MSe=1.32, also after Geisser-Greenhouse correction of the dfs. Bonferonni-corrected separate t-tests showed 
that at p=.05 the mean differences were reliable between no prior outcome and prior gain and prior loss and prior 
gain. No pairwise mean differences were reliable in the concurrent decisions group. The prior-outcome group 
differed reliably from the concurrent-decisions group for prior gain. 
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Table 1. Mean percentages of choices of gambling in the prior-outcome and the concurrent-decisions groups (Experiment 1).  
 
No prior outcome  Prior loss  Prior gain 
Prior outcome             40.6       31.3       60.9 
Concurrent decisions                            37.6       40.6       46.8 
 
 
     The results were as expected in the prior-outcome group, thus replicating the results of several previous 
experiments supporting the loss-sensitivity principle (Garling & Romanus, 1997; Garling et al., 1994; Romanus et 
al., 1996, 1997). According to our hypothesis, integration was also expected in the concurrent-decisions groups. 
Since the results failed to show this, the question must be raised why no integration of outcomes was observed when 
participants made concurrent decisions. It should be noted that Garling and Romanus (1997) and Tversky and Shafir 
(1992) found that a prior outcome that is not yet known was ignored in making a subsequent decision. Thus, the 
uncertainty assigned to future outcomes of concurrent decisions may be the reason why they are not integrated. 
5. Experiment 2 
     It is possible that an uncertain outcome of a decision prevents participants from integrating it with other 
outcomes since they do not believe it will occur. However, it may be more likely that they believe that a highly 
desirable or undesirable outcome will occur. Making the outcomes more desirable may then increase the likelihood 
that they are integrated. The primary aim of Experiment 2 was to explore this possibility. Drawing on Romanus et 
al. (1996) who found that integration increased when participants were made aware of a possible loss, in Experiment 
2 we contrast one group of participants who were offered bonuses making them sensitive to losses with another 
group of participants who were offered bonuses making them sensitive to gains. If the bonuses make uncertain 
outcomes more desirable to obtain or avoid, in accordance with the loss-sensitivity principle we believe that the loss 
outcomes of concurrent decisions will be integrated. As in Experiment 1 we compare one group of participants who 
are informed about prior outcomes with another group of participants who are asked to make concurrent decisions. 
In one of the decisions which the latter group made, with the probability of .50 the dominant options led to the same 
outcomes (losses or gains) as participants in the other group were told that they had experienced. 
     The loss-sensitivity principle has been shown to hold for choices of gambling, that is, when participants are faced 
with choices between possible gains or losses and status quo. In Experiment 2 we also attempt to extend the loss-
sensitivity principle to choices between losses and between gains respectively. A straight-forward generalization of 
the loss-sensitivity principle is that we expect integration of a prior outcome to occur only for choices between 
losses, not for choices between gains. The choices are made between a sure loss and an even chance of losing twice 
the amount or nothing. In accordance with prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Fox, 1995; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) the value of the sure loss (x<0) may then be written: V(x) = v(x) - π(.5)v(2x) (2). 
Because v is a convex function (v(x+y) > v(x)+v(y); x,y<0), a prior loss added to both loss outcomes will lead to a 
less negative evaluation of the sure loss and render it more likely to be chosen. In other words, participants are 
expected to become more risk aversive. The reverse is predicted when the prior outcome is a gain. In this case, 
participants will thus become more risk seeking. Our predictions are given in Table 2. 
     We expect that participants in the concurrent-decisions groups will integrate loss outcomes of the concurrent 
decisions when they are promised a loss-minimizing bonus, not otherwise. Therefore, participants in this bonus 
group will make the same choices as the prior-outcome groups in all conditions except when they make choices 
between gains in the first decision and between losses in the second decision. Participants in the concurrent-
decisions groups who are promised a gain-maximizing bonus are expected to differ from the prior-outcome groups 
when participants in these groups make choices between losses. 
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Table 2. Predictions of integration in Experiment 2. (NI=No integration; RS = Integration leading to increased risk 
seeking; RA = Integration leading to decreased risk seeking). 
 
Prior loss    Prior gain 
 
      Current            Current          Current               Current 
        loss                   gain            loss                      gain 
 
Prior outcome 
Gain-maximization                                                RA                       NI                RS     NI 
Loss-minimization                                 RA      NI               RS     NI 
 
Concurrent decisions 
Gain-maximization                                 NI        NI                  NI                       NI 
Loss-minimization                                 RA        NI               NI                       NI 
 
6. Method 
6.1. Participants 
     Another 64 participants were recruited from the same pool of undergraduates. An equal number of men and 
women were randomly assigned to four groups which each consisted of 16 participants. Participants were paid the 
equivalent of approximately USD 7.00. 
6.2. Design 
     The design was mixed factorial with two between-subjects and two within-subject factors. One between-subjects 
factor was whether participants were informed about a prior outcome or asked to make two concurrent decisions. 
Another between-subjects factor was whether or not participants received bonuses inducing gain maximization or 
loss minimization. The within-subject factors were whether there was no prior outcome/decision, a prior outcome or 
first decision that was a gain, or a prior outcome or first decision that was a loss, and whether the second decision 
was a gain or loss. 
6.3. Materials and Procedure 
     The materials differed from Experiment 1 in the following respects. In the block with single bets, half of the bets 
consisted of choices between an even chance of winning a certain amount or nothing and winning half that amount 
for sure. The other half consisted of choices between an even chance of losing a certain amount or nothing and 
losing half the amount for sure. For different bets the amounts were SEK 1600 and SEK 800 (the equivalent of 
approximately USD 200.00 and USD 100.00), SEK 2400 and SEK 1200, and SEK 3200 and SEK 1600, 
respectively. Each bet was presented twice in an individually randomized order. Half of the participants were 
presented the block with single bets first, the other half last. 
     In the other block the single bets were in the concurrent-decisions groups presented below another bet which was 
the same as in Experiment 1. In the prior-outcome groups the same prior losses and gains were presented before the 
single bets were presented. Each prior gain or choice between gains and prior loss or choice between losses was 
presented twice, once combined with a choice between gains and once combined with a choice between losses. As 
an example, in one trial participants in the concurrent-decisions groups were given a choice between winning SEK 
3,200 or nothing and winning SEK 2,400 or nothing followed by a choice between an even chance of winning SEK 
1,600 or nothing and a sure gain of SEK 800. In the corresponding trial, participants in the prior-outcome groups 
were first told that they had won SEK 3,200, then asked to make a choice between an even chance of winning SEK 
1600 or nothing and a sure gain of SEK 800. In another trial, participants in the concurrent decisions groups were 
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given a choice between a loss of SEK 4,000 or nothing and a loss of SEK 3,200 or nothing, followed by a choice 
between an even chance of winning SEK 1600 or nothing and a sure gain of SEK 800. Before making the latter 
choice, participants in the prior-outcome groups were told that they had lost SEK 3,200. In yet another trial, 
participants in the concurrent-decisions groups first had a choice between winning SEK 3,200 or nothing and 
winning SEK 2,400 or nothing, followed by a choice between an even chance of losing SEK 1600 or nothing and a 
sure loss of SEK 800. In the prior-outcome groups participants were told that they had won SEK 3,200, then to 
make the latter choice.  
     The procedure was essentially the same as in the preceding experiment except that the general instructions 
promised participants a bonus. Specifically, participants were told that the computer would randomly determine the 
outcomes of five randomly selected bets. The computer would also randomly determine a lower limit on the amount 
won. If this limit were exceeded, participants would receive a bonus of the equivalent of approximately USD 7.00 in 
addition to the fee they were paid for participating. With the aim of inducing loss minimization, half of the 
participants in the concurrent-decisions and prior-outcome groups were also told that they would receive no bonus if 
they in one of the randomly selected gambles would lose more than an amount randomly determined by the 
computer. Participants were debriefed and paid after having participated in the sessions which lasted for 
approximately 30 minutes. All participants were paid the bonus they had been promised. 
 
7. Findings and results 
     In the concurrent-decisions groups, a large majority of the first decisions were as expected made of the dominant 
option (98.5% for gains, 93.5% for losses). An ANOVA did not yield any significant effects. Table 3 displays the 
percentages of choices of the sure options. In support of prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky 1979; Tversky & 
Fox, 1995; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992), when there were no prior outcome, participants tended to choose the sure 
gains and the risky losses. This was substantiated by a 2 (gain-maximizing vs. loss-minimizing bonus) by 2 
(concurrent decisions vs. decisions with prior outcome) by 3 (no prior outcome/decision vs. prior loss vs. prior gain) 
by 2 (current loss vs. current gain) mixed ANOVA with repeated measures on the last three factors that yielded a 
significant main effect of current outcome, F(1, 60) = 63.17, p<.001, Mse=.22 A difference was also observed in 
that participants whose bonus depended on avoiding losses (loss-minimizing bonus) were less risk seeking when 
they chose between gains than participants whose bonus depended on the amount they won (gain-maximizing 
bonus). This was substantiated by a significant interaction between current outcome and bonus, F(1, 60) = 7.15, 
p=.01, MSe=.22. Tukey post hoc tests showed at p=.05 that the differences between the group means were reliable 
for current gain and the differences between current loss and current gain were reliable in both groups. 
     As may be further seen in Table 3, no integration occurred in the concurrent-decisions groups. A separate 
ANOVA on the second decisions made by the concurrent-decisions groups only revealed a significant main effect of 
current outcome (p<.001). Thus, the loss-minimizing bonus did not seem to have had an effect. It should also be 
noted that the integration of a prior outcome was not exactly as expected in the prior outcome groups. A prior loss 
appeared as expected to decrease risk seeking for choices between losses. However, no increase in risk seeking was 
observed after a prior gain. In addition, a prior gain increased risk seeking when choices were made between gains.    
 
Table 3. Mean percentages of choices of the sure options in prior-outcome and concurrent-decisions groups for gain-maximizing or loss-
minimizing bonus (Experiment 2). 
 
No prior outcome                       Prior loss       Prior gain 
 
Current Current   Current Current   Current Current 
  loss    gain     loss    gain     loss    gain 
 
Prior outcome 
Gain-maximization                     25.3   56.7    38.6    46.1    33.2    33.5 
Loss-minimization                     23.5   73.3    42.8    67.3    31.3    56.7 
 
Concurrent decisions 
Gain-maximization                     13.4   60.6    27.4    63.8    27.1    54.4 
Loss-minimization                     13.8    75.5    10.9    85.4    15.6    79.2 
557 Ole Boe and Tommy Garling /  Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  190 ( 2015 )  550 – 558 
 
     A separate ANOVA confined to the prior-outcome groups yielded a significant interaction between prior 
outcome and current outcome, F(1.82, 56.50) = 4.89, p<.05, MSe=.40, after Geisser-Greenhouse correction of the 
dfs. Separate Bonferonni-corrected t-tests showed that at p=.05 the mean differences between current loss and gain 
were reliable for no prior outcome and for prior losses. For current gain the mean difference between no prior 
outcome and prior gain was reliable, and for current loss the mean difference between no prior outcome and prior 
loss was reliable. 
    It may thus be concluded that the loss-sensitivity principle does not generalize in a straight-forward manner to 
choices between losses, although it was found that risk seeking decreased after a loss when participants were facing 
another possible loss. Furthermore, substantiating the negative finding of Experiment 1, no integration was observed 
when participants made concurrent decisions. Although the loss-minimizing bonus decreased risk seeking, it did not 
affect integration. 
8. Conclusions 
The basic goal of this research was to test whether the loss-sensitivity principle explains how concurrent 
decisions are integrated. This principle implies that participants integrate losses. In Experiment 1 the results were 
consistent with the principle applied to integration of prior outcomes. However, no integration was observed of the 
outcomes of the concurrent decisions. In Experiment 2 it was assumed that increasing participants´ sensitivity to 
losses by means of promising them a bonus would make them employ a worst-case scenario and reason as if the loss 
outcomes had occurred. If so, they were believed to be more likely to integrate the outcomes of the concurrent 
decisions. In a similar vein Romanus et al. (1996) found that increasing salience of the loss outcome increased 
integration. However, the results of Experiment 2 were also negative. In addition, the integration of a prior outcome 
was in Experiment 2 different from that predicted from the loss-sensitivity principle when participants made choices 
between gains or losses respectively. 
     A possible explanation of the negative finding that no integration of the outcomes of the concurrent decisions 
occurred is still that uncertain outcomes are ignored (Garling & Romanus, 1997; Tversky & Shafir, 1992). The 
bonus was perhaps not effective in making participants reason as if the loss outcomes had occurred. Similarly, 
Garling and Romanus (1997) failed to induce this kind of reasoning by increasing the probability of the loss. 
Another possible explanation of why participants failed to integrate the concurrent decisions is that too much 
cognitive strain was imposed by the requirement to enumerate the different uncertain outcomes and their 
combinations. If one or both of these explanations are valid, integration should be expected of outcomes of 
concurrent choices between few options with certain outcomes. 
     A third possibility is that participants did not perceive the outcomes of the different decisions to be related. This 
may seem unlikely given that the outcomes were money. Also, the bonus promised to the participants in Experiment 
2 should have increased their feeling that the decision outcomes were related. Although the results of Experiment 2 
showed integration of a prior outcome, this integration was not as predicted from the loss-sensitivity principle. It 
appears then that the principle does not extend to choices between losses. It may be noted that the results were 
consistent with prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Fox, 1995; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992).  
     An alternative explanation not inconsistent with the general notion underlying the loss-sensitivity principle is the 
following, which builds on Heath´s (1995) suggestion that people set mental budgets in order to track their losses. In 
Experiment 1 and many previous experiments (Garling & Romanus, 1997; Garling et al., 1994; Romanus et al., 
1996; Romanus et al., 1997), the gambles were mixed entailing both a gain and a loss. In a mixed gamble 
participants may focus on the loss, disregarding the gain. They do not ignore a prior outcome but integrate it with 
the loss. In this situation integration reflects loss-minimization. If participants face two gains as they did in 
Experiment 2, again they may not ignore a prior outcome, but in order to minimize the loss choose the certain gain 
after a loss but not after a gain. Facing two losses they likewise attempt to minimize the loss by choosing the certain 
loss after a loss to a greater extent than after a gain. 
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